

Message Text

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SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 27,
1975 (SALT TWO-585)

1. VERIFICATION: SHCHUKIN (TO MAY, A-795) EMPHASIZED RIGHT AT THE START OF THE CONVERSATION THAT SEMENOV'S STATEMENT TODAY REJECTED "THE CONTENT" OF THE PROTOCOL ONLY, NOT THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROTOCOL. HE THEN ASKED MAY TO CLARIFY THE SUGGESTION MAY HAD MADE AT AN EARLIER MEETING WITH REGARD TO DEALING WITH SPECIFIC TYPES OF MISSILE SYSTEMS.

2. MAY SAID THAT, IN SEARCHING FOR WAYS IN WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE MIGHT PUT FORTH SOME IDEAS REGARDING WHAT IT CONSIDERED AN ACCEPTABLE PROTOCOL, THE POSSIBILITY HAD OCCURED TO HIM THAT THE SOVIET SIDE MIGHT LIKE TO DEAL SEPARATELY, WITH SOME OF THE PROBLEMS WE SAW. THUS, WITH REGARD TO MIRVED ICBMS, IF (AND MAY EMPHASIZED THAT HE COULD NOT BE SURE) ONLY MIRVED SS-17S AND SS-19S WERE GOING TO BE DEPLOYED, OUR COUNTING RULES WITH REGARD TO THOSE SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT CAUSE THE SOVIET SIDE A PRACTICAL PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT STILL HAVE A PROBLEM REGARDING THE FORM OF THE PROVISIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND,

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WITH REGARD TO THE SS-18, IF BOTH A MIRVED AND AN UNMIRVED

VERSION WERE DEPLOYED THERE WOULD BE A PROBLEM OF SUBSTANCE. THE SOVIET SIDE MIGHT LIKE TO FOCUS ON THE LATTER PROBLEM AND SUGGEST SOME SOLUTION RELEVANT TO IT AS A BEGINNING. MAY SAID THIS WAS HIS OWN SUGGESTION AND ONLY ONE OF A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE WAYS IN WHICH WE COULD TRY TO GET OUT OF THE SITUATION WE FOUND OURSELVES IN. SHCHUKIN STATED THAT, WHILE HE COULD NEITHER CONFIRM NOR DENY ANY OF THE SUPPOSITIONS MAY HAD MADE ABOUT THE SYSTEMS WE DISCUSSED, HE WOULD CONSIDER THE SUGGESTION.

3. SHCHUKIN THEN IT SAID "WHAT ABOUT SLBMS?" HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ALL OF OUR SLBMS WERE NOW MIRVED. MAY SAID THAT WAS NOT THE CASE. HE SAID THERE WAS THE POLARIS MISSILE WHICH HAD MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES AND THE POSEIDON MISSILES WHICH WERE MIRVED. MAY SAID THAT THE U.S. SIDE DREW A VERY CAREFUL LINE BETWEEN MRV AND MIRV, THAT THE MIRV PROVISIONS OF OUR DRAFT DID NOT APPLY TO MRVS AND MAY ASSUMED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE DREW THE SAME DISTINCTION. WAS MAY MISTAKEN IN THAT ASSUMPTION? ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF MISUNDERSTANDING THE QUESTION, SHCHUKIN, SOMEWHAT TO MAY'S SURPRISE, DID NOT ANSWER. HE HAD ALSO NOT ANSWERED A SIMILAR QUESTION IN THE PAST.

4. BELETSKY (TO ROWNY, A-794) SAID THE U.S. APPEARED TO BE EQUATING THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING A NEW AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT OUR PRIMARY EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON THE NEW AGREEMENT AND NOT ON VERIFICATION. ROWNY TOLD BELETSKY THE TWO WENT HAND-IN-HAND AND THAT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION WAS LINKED INEXTRICABLY TO THE NEW AGREEMENT; THERE COULD BE NO NEW AGREEMENT UNLESS IT COULD BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED.

5. TRUSOV CAME TO BELETSKY'S RESCUE, SAYING THAT THE SOVIET SIDE UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION BUT THAT THE US HAD TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM FROM THE SOVIET'S POINT OF VIEW. HE SAID THEIR SIDE HAD NO PROBLEM WITH VERIFICATION AND OURS DID; THEREFORE, THE BURDEN WAS ON US TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM IN A WAY SATISFACTORY TO THEM. ROWNY SAID HE AGREED THAT EACH SIDE HAD TO LOOK AT THE PROBLEM FROM THE OTHER'S POINT OF VIEW AND ADDED THAT THIS ADMONITION WAS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE TO THE ISSUE UNDER DISCUSSION. WE PERCEIVED A PROBLEM AND THE SOVIET SIDE'S RELUCTANCE TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY

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ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION WAS NOT HELPFUL.

6. TRUSOV SAID THAT AMBASSADOR JOHNSON HAD, IN A PREVIOUS STATEMENT, SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD TESTED A PARTICULAR MISSILE IN A MIRVED AND NON-MIRVED MODE. TRUSOV SAID THAT SINCE THE SOVIETS WERE INTENDING TO DEPLOY THAT MISSILE IN BOTH MODES, THE U.S. WOULD BE COUNTING ALL MISSILES OF THAT TYPE AS BEING MIRVED UNDER THE 1320 AGGREGATE. OBVIOUSLY UNCOMFORTABLE ABOUT

REFERRING TO A SPECIFIC MISSILE SYSTEM, HE SAID THAT FOR EX-AMPLE, ALL SS-18S WOULD UNDER OUR RULES BE COUNTED AS BEING MIRVED. ROWNY SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD NO WISH TO COUNT NON-MIRVED MISSILES AGAINST THE 1320 AGGREGATE BUT THAT WE NEEDED ASSURANCE THAT ALL SS-18S WERE NOT IN FACT MIRVED.

7. TRUSOV SAID THEY HAD SIMILAR PROBLEM WITH THE FUTURE REPLACEMENT OF AGING MMIIS. HOW COULD ROWNY ASSURE THEM THAT FUTURE CONVERSIONS OF SILOS CONTAINING MMIIS WOULD NOT CAUSE VERIFICATION PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS? ROWNY SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE HAD HEARD THE SOVIET SIDE MENTION THAT THEY HAD A PROBLEM VERIFYING WHICH OF OUR SYSTEMS WERE MIRVED. IN FACT, THEY HAD SAID THAT "OVER TIME" EACH SIDE COULD TELL WHICH MISSILES WERE MIRVED AND WHICH WERE NOT. TRUSOV CAME BACK WITH A QUICK REJOINDER THAT THEY HAD NO PROBLEM WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION BUT FORESAW A PROBLEM IN THE FUTURE. ROWNY SAID THAT IN THAT CASE WE WERE PREPARED TO ASSUME THE BURDEN OF PROOF AND WERE PREPARED TO WORK OUT MUTUALLY AGREEABLE PROCEDURES TO GIVE THE SOVIETS ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES THAT WE WERE NOT EXCEEDING THE MIRV LIMITATION. ROWNY ENDED BY SAYING THAT WHAT WE WERE SEEKING WAS A RECIPROCAL OFFER FROM THEIR SIDE.

8. MAY, IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH SHCHUKIN (A-795), ALSO SAID THAT, IN ADDITION TO MISSILES CURRENTLY UNDER DEPLOYMENT, WE WOULD HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT FUTURE MISSILE SYSTEMS. SHCHUKIN AGREED AND NOTED THAT, WHILE HE PERSONALLY NOW COUNTED OUR MINUTEMAN II AS UNMIRVED, WE WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO REPLACE THEM AND THEN HE DID NOT KNOW HOW THE REPLACEMENTS SHOULD BE COUNTED.

9. NON-TRANSFER: SALTYKOV AND FINAGIN (A-796) PRESSED FOR THE VIEWS OF ZEMACH AND TARPGAARD ON MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT ON NON-TRANSFER. WHAT WAS THE U.S. POSITION? ZEMACH NOTED THAT
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THE U.S. HAD ALREADY STATED ITS POSITION AND IN FACT MINISTER SEMENOV HAD QUOTED IT IN HIS STATEMENT. SALTYKOV SAID THAT THE U.S. POSITION DATED BACK TO 1973 AND PROMISED THAT THE U.S. WOULD ADDRESS NONTRANSFER AFTER THE SCOPE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS WAS MADE CLEAR. HE THOUGHT THE U.S. SHOULD BE READY TO ADDRESS NONTRANSFER NOW. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THIS. ZEMACH SAID THAT THE AMERICAN POSITION HAD NOT CHANGED. THERE WERE MANY ISSUES TO DISCUSS AND IN FACT WE HAD BEEN REVIEWING MANY OF THEM IN OUR STATEMENTS.

10. ZEMACH AND TARPGAARD TRIED TO GET SALTYKOV TO EXPLAIN THE SOVIET NON-TRANSFER PROPOSAL. TARPGAARD ASKED IF THE TRANSFER BY THE U.S. OF F-4'S TO ANOTHER COUNTRY WOULD BE FORBIDDEN BY THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. SALTYKOV SAID NO BECAUSE THE F-4 IS NOT A STRATEGIC WEAPON. (COMMENT: SALTYKOV GAVE THIS ANSWER

STRAIGHTFORWARDLY WITHOUT ANY HESITATION.)

11. ZEMACH ASKED IF THE SOVIET NON-TRANSFER PROPOSAL WOULD INTERFERE WITH ORDINARY U.S. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS OR WITH U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO ITS ALLIES IN AREAS NOT COVERED BY SALT. SALTYKOV SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT THE ANSWER WAS NO BECAUSE ONLY STRATEGIC ARMS WERE CONCERNED. TO PIN THIS DOWN ZEMACH ASKED IF IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR SALTYKOV TO STATE THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ITS ALLIES OUTSIDE THE SALT AREA. SALTYKOV REPLIED THAT ONLY STRATEGIC ARMS AND THEIR COMPONENTS SHOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED, BUT THAT THIS WAS HIS PERSONAL OPINION. JOHNSON

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